The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. This paper develops a qualified defense of intuitionism against a recent objection, due to Nicholas Sturgeon: if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their further commitment to foundationalism leads them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. The good news is that, irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism doesn't commit them to the existence of non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable) where its existence would be implausible.
Introduction
The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. This epistemological doctrine doesn't entail certain philosophical * Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly. Thanks to Erik Johnson, Antti Kauppinen, Russ Shafer-Landau, two anonymous referees for Philosophical Quarterly, and an anonymous referee for another journal for useful comments. Also thanks to Brendan Jackson for helpful conversations. 1 excesses that critics have often attributed to intuitionism, such as that we have some dedicated faculty of ethical intuition or that beliefs based on ethical intuition are infallible or self-guaranteeing. 1 Nor does it require various other positions that have often been often associated with the intuitionist tradition in moral philosophy, such as a non-naturalist metaphysics of ethical facts and properties or irreducible pluralism in axiology and normative ethics. Although much still remains to be done in defense of ethical intuitionism, it has of late been getting a worse rap than it deserves. This paper focuses on the recent objection that intuitionism implies an implausible epistemology outside ethics. The good news is that the objection in question fails to establish this. The bad news is that whether ethical intuitionism implies a plausible epistemology within ethics depends on how we resolve certain outstanding issues in other areas of philosophy.
The Standard Argument for Ethical Intuitionism
According to ethical intuitionism, some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential.
Speaking roughly, inferential knowledge is knowledge that is based on other things one knows by reasonable inference. The nature of this 'based on' relation is a complicated matter, but at minimum it marks some kind of positive dependence of a belief's status as knowledge on the factors from which the belief derives its status as knowledge. 2 In the case of inferential knowledge, these factors may be other propositions that one knows or other beliefs one has (or has 'available') that count as knowledge. Knowledge that p may then be a case of inferential knowledge even if the psychological process that produced the belief wasn't an actual inference, so long 1 In what follows I'll largely jettison the word 'intuition' altogether. Not only do different writers use the word in quite different ways. From W. D. Ross onwards, many ethical intuitionists themselves have preferred to avoid using 'intuition' in expounding their theory because the word can be misleading in various ways.
2 For a distinction between positive and negative epistemic dependence, see e.g. Robert Audi,
The Structure Of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 144.
as the belief's status as knowledge positively depends on whether it is reasonably inferable from other things one knows. (How to understand this idea depends on how generously we understand the notion of inference. For example, would the reasonable inferences have to be explicit if they were drawn, or could they be implicit?) Accordingly, still speaking roughly, non-inferential knowledge is knowledge that needn't be based on reasonable inference from other supporting propositions or beliefs that count as knowledge. (Of course, one might know some such supporting propositions all the same. If p can be known non-inferentially, it doesn't follow that p cannot also be known inferentially. If there are ways other than reasonable inference for knowledge that p to be based on other propositions or beliefs that count as knowledge, then in those cases we can say that knowledge that p is 'mediated'
by them if it comes, at least in part, from one's knowledge of other propositions, and 'immediate' otherwise. 3 In this terminology, non-inferential knowledge would be knowledge that doesn't come even in part from other, supporting propositions that one knows or the fact that one knows them. In what follows, however, I'll follow the targets of my discussion in sticking to the terms 'inferential' and 'noninferential' even though the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate' might on occasion be more apt. We can give analogous rough characterizations of the notions of inferential and non-inferential, and mediate and immediate, epistemic justification. In what follows, however, I'll often simplify by talking about knowledge even when it would be more apt to talk about epistemic justification.) To make things a bit more precise, I'll take ethical intuitionism to require that ethical knowledge can be based by some non-inferential mechanism on some kind of reasons or evidence, where such non-doxastic states as experiences and phenomenal and intellectual appearances of various sorts are typically taken to be capable of presenting the relevant kind of reasons or evidence.
One reason to understand the core thesis of intuitionism -that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential -along the above lines is that then intuitionism purports to solve the skeptical regress problem for ethical knowledge. 4 For if one knows that p non-inferentially, then there is no further proposition that one must know in order to know that p. This would stop the regress.
Another reason to understand ethical intuitionism in this way is that it reflects an argument that has influenced most intuitionists and their critics alike. 
(S6) Ethical Non-Skepticism:
We have some ethical knowledge.
(S7) Therefore, some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. 5
(S1) is a reasonable general assumption. (S2) entails that not all of our ethical knowledge falls under clause (c) in (S1). So (S1) and (S2) jointly entail (S3). (S4), which strictly speaking doesn't exhaust foundationalism but only states a salient implication of it, entails that not all of our ethical knowledge falls under clause (b) in (S1). So (S3) and (S4) jointly entail (S5). Finally, (S5) and (S6) jointly entail the core thesis of intuitionism in (S7). So the standard argument is valid.
The standard argument teaches us that if we combine foundationalism with the autonomy of ethics, then we face a choice between skepticism and intuitionism about ethics. We must also realize that the standard argument is valid independently of the fact that it concerns ethics. A parallel argument concerning the future or the unobservable would be equally valid. The argument therefore seems to generalize:
combining foundationalism with the autonomy of our thought about a given topic forces a choice between intuitionism and skepticism about the topic in question. 6
Since the standard argument is valid, any critic of ethical intuitionism must reject at least one of its premises. Only skeptics about ethical knowledge reject (S6). (This is a move I'll bracket in this paper.) Given that (S1) is a reasonable assumption, any non-skeptical critic of intuitionism must therefore reject either (S2) or (S4). But for my present purposes we can simply set aside the familiar "cheap" counterexamples to the autonomy of ethics and assume that (S2) is true. The objection to ethical intuitionism that is my concern in this paper challenges foundationalism. 
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The objection in question, which is due to Nicholas Sturgeon, is that we must reject ethical intuitionism because, given a certain plausible general rationale for the autonomy of ethics, its commitment to foundationalism leads intuitionism to an implausible epistemology outside ethics.
Sturgeon offers a naturalistic 'rationale' for the autonomy of ethics. He notes that 'our thought about the natural world is highly populated by areas that are autonomous with respect to the evidence we bring to bear on them' (Sturgeon, p. 201).
We cannot reasonably infer, for instance, any conclusion about unobservables from premises that are entirely about observables, or any conclusion about psychological states solely from observations of behavior. This is because assessments of evidence for theoretical conclusions are 'theory-dependent'. In deciding what to think, for instance, about a conclusion concerning unobservables in the light of some observed facts, we typically find ourselves having to rely not just on our understanding of the observed facts and the conclusion but also on a large body of auxiliary assumptions which will inevitably include some theoretical assumptions and some of which will concern unobservables. The autonomy of many areas of our thought about the natural world is plausibly explained by how theory-dependence of this kind pervades our reasoning in those areas. It is then plausible that the explanation for the autonomy of ethics is probably the same. Ethical intuitionists should agree, unless they can give a good reason to think that the autonomy of ethics requires an exceptional explanation. (Sturgeon, p. 201.) Sturgeon then argues that this naturalistic rationale for the autonomy of ethics is available to intuitionists only at a high epistemological cost. The rationale commits us to the autonomy of our thought about the past, the future, the unobservable, the psychological, and many other topics. As we saw, combining foundationalism with the autonomy of our thought about a given topic forces a choice between intuitionism and skepticism about the topic in question. More would need to be said fully to assess this addendum to Sturgeon's main objection to ethical intuitionism. For instance, Sturgeon grants that any broad notion of a belief's being based on inference needs ultimately to be justified on the basis of its role in a plausible epistemology and not merely by the above sort of dialectical considerations (p. 209). We would need to determine just how broad a notion of inference is required for applying the autonomy of ethics in the familiar manner. We might think twice if it turned out that it requires a notion that counts, for instance, knowledge would presumably concern particular rather than general ethical facts.)
To make this more precise, one could say that one form of ethical cognition is perception-like in that it involves exercising a conceptually and intellectually sophisticated ability much like the ability to see that a person is in pain or amused, or the ability to see that one can checkmate in five moves, or the ability to hear that one of the pistons isn't firing or that a chord is C# minor. Consider this famous example from Gilbert Harman:
If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong. 14 Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley suggest that knowing that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong is like knowing that a particular wine is fine and that knowing the latter is like knowing that a wine has a start of herbs and dark berries:
each can be known through exercising an acquired perceptual skill that is augmented by intellect. 15 If we think that tasting a start of herbs and dark berries is no less a result of perceptual training than tasting fineness in wine, we might well think that seeing that the hoodlums are torturing a cat for fun is no less a result of perceptual training than seeing that their action is wrong. We might well think that in both cases successful training improves our capacity to recognize qualities that reside in the objects all along. 16
The problem with this perceptual form of a posteriori intuitionism as we so far By the same token, nothing in the perceptual form of a posteriori intuitionism as we so far have it rules out the possibility that the ethical knowledge we have by perception is nonetheless based, at least in part, by inference on other things we know. Hence a posteriori intuitionists have yet to show that perception gives us ethical knowledge that is non-inferential in some relevantly broad sense of inference.
Let 'OTL' be the claim that all observation is theory-laden. In responding to Sturgeon's objection, a posteriori intuitionists must first contest the claim that,
given OTL, none of one's perceptual knowledge is based just on the experiences that one has but rather is always based partly on reasonable inference from some background beliefs one has. To get going, they might follow James Pryor in noting that there are many senses in which observation might be theory-laden: Of course, this cognitive psychology is speculative. But it is a relevant alternative because Sturgeon's case that ethical beliefs are products of inference isn't empirical.
He notes that we need to explain why 'the only people with physical intuition worth trusting are those with extensive knowledge of highly sophisticated, approximately true physical theory and lot of experience in applying it' and why such beliefs 'tend to be most reliable when the background assumptions on which they rest are true' (Sturgeon, p. 203) . He then argues that these facts suggest that a belief such as that there goes a proton, which a scientist might form upon observing a vapor trail in a cloud chamber, must be based on inference if it is to count as knowledge. Since ethical beliefs are essentially similar to such beliefs with respect to the conditions under which they are reliable, we should treat the two in the same way.
The alternative that the a posteriori intuitionist offers is that we can perceive eth-ical properties as being instantiated because our ethical background beliefs endow us with cognitive dispositions to do so. If true, this would provide an epistemologically well-motivated account of why perceptual ethical beliefs tend to be most reliable when we have (at least approximately) true ethical background beliefs and why some of them can nonetheless count as non-inferential knowledge. And yet if we can perceive ethical properties as being instantiated, it doesn't follow that in the similar way perception also gives us non-inferential knowledge about topics like the past, the future, or the unobservable. Whether we can perceive properties of a given kind is something to settle largely on a case-by-case basis. Hence we also cannot assume that a parallel defense of a posteriori intuitionism about extra-sensory perception concerning the past, the future, or the unobservable would be equally plausible. 
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knowledge. It is no problem if a proposition that is knowable solely on the basis of an adequate understanding of it may be knowable also by inference from premises. It is also no problem if being able adequately to understand a proposition may require the capacity to draw inferences that serve to bring out the content of the proposition, such as inferences concerning its application to cases. Since the inferences that one must thereby be able to draw are inferences from rather than to a proposition, the fact that coming to understand a self-evident proposition may involve inference doesn't show that believing it on the basis of understanding it is a product of inference. Nor does it show that the belief depends for its status as knowledge on inference from premises about the proposition's implications. 32
A priori intuitionists can also accommodate various versions of Sturgeon's claim that ethical beliefs are theory-laden much in the way that physical observations are.
They can accommodate an analogue of OTL2. We may indeed require certain background beliefs to understand a self-evident proposition. Whether a priori intuitionism is committed, in virtue of its commitment to self-evident ethical truths, to an implausible epistemology within ethics is a more difficult question. Many intuitionists are able to offer at least some examples of ethical propositions that seem true to a broad range of subjects once they think they have understood the propositions in question but before they entertain arguments for or against them. Examples might be that enjoyment is better than suffering, I have also yet to see a reliable test for determining whether a proposition is self-evident. Some ethical claims, such as perhaps the principles of equality that the Declaration of Independence declares to be self-evident, may be such that it is hard to know where to begin arguing for them. Instead we tend to make sure that those who disagree have understood the claim and aren't crazy. But such claims aren't supposed to exhaust the class of self-evident ethical propositions even by a priori intuitionists' own lights. We can also hardly assume that asking someone whether a proposition seems true to her once she thinks she has understood it but before she entertains arguments for or against it is a reliable test. Many propositions that are false or at least require argument may nonetheless seem true to us owing to the influence of such potentially distorting factors as partiality, prejudice, emotion, or certain kinds of upbringing. 37 A critic like Sturgeon could well also say that even when we aren't subject to distorting factors, our assessment of a given proposition is often influenced, in a broadly inferential way, by our background beliefs. 
Conclusion
Ethical intuitionism is the view that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. only if we have reason to think that it is an exception to this general trend; but (c) we can have reason to think that a given belief is exceptionally not subject to distorting factors only if we are able to confirm the belief by inferring it from other beliefs (such as beliefs to the effect that the belief has been formed in a reliable way). 44 I cannot here settle whether ethical intuitionists can answer this objection.
But I suggest that their responses will be subject to the same moral as I have drawn about intuitionist responses to Sturgeon's objection.
Ethical intuitionists allow that truths that can be known non-inferentially might also be known on the basis of inference. Hence the force of Sinnott-Armstrong's objection depends on how plausible it is that if very many ethical beliefs are subject to distortion, then any ethical belief counts as knowledge only when, and to that extent because, the believer is able to confirm that belief by inferring it from other beliefs. (Only when the belief derives its status as knowledge at least in part from the believer's having this inferential ability.) The truth of this claim is a general epistemological problem that has nothing special to do with ethical knowledge.
Relevant to its solution are such issues as how, in general, a significant chance of 
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the presence of epistemic defeaters bears on justification and knowledge, and how plausible certain general higher-order requirements on epistemic justification and knowledge are. The problem also bears on the philosophical force of those epistemic principles, favored by many contemporary foundationalists, according to which it is prima facie rationally permissible to assume that things are the way they appear. 45
Any solution to the problem will imply a stand on these general epistemological issues. We might also wonder whether an argument against intuitionism that has nothing special to do with ethics would generalize to support a more global skepticism. Might it show that no source of belief is a source of knowledge unless we have reason to trust the kind of beliefs in question?
I suspect, then, that any response to Sinnott-Armstrong's objection to ethical intuitionism will carry specific commitments in outstanding issues in general epistemology. If that is right, then our support for ethical intuitionism should for now remain merely conditional in this respect as well. The moral I draw is that in order fully to assess ethical intuitionism we must take a thorough account of various issues in other areas of philosophy -not only in epistemology, but also in philosophy of mind and language, and beyond. Our support for ethical intuitionism should accordingly remain conditional on how the relevant outstanding issues in these other areas are resolved. Thus ethical intuitionism depends for its viability less on anything special about ethics than on more general philosophical considerations. In this respect, at least, ethical intuitionism seems to be no different from other accounts of ethical knowledge that are currently on offer.
